State, Religion, and Revolution in Iran, 1796 to the Present (Middle East Today)

This difficult but interesting book is about exactly what its title says.. It is not a history but a socio-history. The period from the Qajars to the Revolution is seen as an example of a process which the author tries to outline using the concepts of social science. He concludes that the usual models for the study of social movements and state formation (from Max Weber) do not fit because Iran is a non-Western country. What model would fit he leaves open.On the accession of the Qajar dynasty in 1796, Iran was, in the author’s words, a “primitive tribal bureaucracy”, mainly ruled through local notables. The armed forces were not centrally organized. Even though Shi’ite Islam had been the official religion for hundreds of years, the Qajars claimed no descendency from Imams as did the previous Safavids so there was little connection between religion and state, except in the case of small dissenting faiths which were frequently persecuted.Later in the nineteenth century, increased contacts with the West resulted in economic growth, beneficial to the Shi’ite ulama (clergy). They were able to institute a “religious tax” on businesses, some of which went to the government and some for their own purposes such as financing seminaries and other centers of learning. The Iran-Russian wars (1808-13) enabled them to increase political influence with the power to issue fatwas on jihad and the power of the sovereign.To provide a basis for such lawmaking, an expansion of Shi’ite jurisprudence occurred. The ‘usuli’ juristic school, involving the use of logic and practical reason, came to predominate, giving the ulama the capability to extend sharia to the resolution of new questions where it had not been usable before. The difficult issues of when to grant the king power over war (jihad) and over taxation required individual jurists of special qualifications, known as ‘mojtahed’.Even with an expanded power of lawmaking, the jurist had to be someone well-known and respected, not just by members of the ulama but also believers in general. This gave rise to an additional qualification, the ‘marja al-taqlid’ or “Source of Emulation.” The higher ranking ulama were unlikely to have personal contact with the Shi’ite population, and not many of their peers either. So marja-al-taqlid became a public, certifiable rank which gave a cleric widely recognized authority even to those who lived far away from him. Only the most senior clerics could grant this distinction, which was based not just as theological study but also practical wisdom.Finally, expanded juristic authority required that the lawmaker have some connection to Allah. As a Westerner might put it, the head of the believers had to be someone with divine charisma. Tradition dictatated that this would be an Imam, the name given one of twelve descendents of Muhammad. (Shortly after the death of Muhammad the only available person to lead was his son in law Ali. Only a descendent of Ali could rule but the chain of descendents was interrupted when the 12th of them became hidden in 939. Believers awaited his return in the future at the head of an army to restore justice on earth. In the meantime the lack of a ruler with the divine connection possessed by the imams was felt. Some later Shi’ite rulers asserted such a connection, but others did not.During the nineteenth century, as Iran moved towards greater involvement with the West, the ulama expanded its presence. At the same time the deficiencies of the traditional government became apparent. In response to resentment over European commercial domination, the ulama led an 1891 boycott over a fifty-year monopoly granted to an Englishman on the sale of tobacco. The Shah (king) was forced to cancel the monopoly and pay the English a large indemnity.The ulama were also part of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1909, when the Shah, in response to various grievances was forced to create by royal order a Majlis (Parliament), and provide for the drafting of a foundational document for a new government. The Electoral Law of 1906 and later laws divided the eligible voters into "classes", specified in terms of occupations and social positions, each of which elected representatives. The ulama wanted to improve the representation of religious students, but was not very successful. Subsequent amendments to the Constitution added considerable religious language. During the years from 1911 to 1925 and after, the ulama kept expanding their institutional presence with more and more madrase (schools) and scholarly institutes.After years of social confusion, Reza Khan, a colonel in Iran’s Cossack Regiment, was appointed Prime Minister by the last Qajar who then decamped for Paris; Reza was appointed Shah in 1926. Reigning until 1941, he was a dictator like Ataturk, but not really a secularist. The ulama lacked strong leadership and tended to accept his rule, but resisted his generally secular outlook on conscription of seminary students, consumption of alcohol, restoration of the sharia courts which had recently been replaced by civil courts, and providing Muslim content to public education.Events took a sharper turn in 1962. By this time the son of Reza Khan, named Mohammed Reza, was on the throne. There was a dispute was over whether the oath of allegiance for local officials should refer to “this celestial book” (the regime’s view) or “the Quran” (the ulama’s view). A relatively obscure cleric, Ruhollah Khomeini, staged a 54-day campaign and forced the regime to retreat. In 1963 there was a referendum on implementation of the Shah’s White Revolution. which led to an uprising. Khomeini became the highest-ranking religious personality arrested by the regime, and was exiled in 1964. But he remained politically active. Apparently by lobbying his clerical associates, he became a Source of Emulation in 1970 shortly after publishing his famous doctrine of ‘velayat faqih’ (guardianship of the jurist) in 1969.Khomeini asserted that the jurist (faqih) has the task of being a guardian (velayat) of the people in the same way that sharia recognizes the task of serving as guardian of a weak-minded person [Further] “...he gave privileged status to the absolute faqih by claiming that his mandate, similar to the mandate of the Imams, was divinely sanctioned.” (p.122)Khomeini’s personal mysticism, as well as his rank among the ulama, assured him of his mission.Sensibly the author devotes almost no space to the much-covered developments from 1979 to the present. He concludes by describing “The Statization of Religion”, meaning that religion is merging into the state. Thus in the seminaries the former humanistic content has been replaced by formalism and legalism and there are new powerholders for whom Islam is more a vocation than a belief system. To those Iranians with a genuine interest in religion, official Islam is losing its appeal and mystical, even non-Islamic forms are beliefs are gaining ground. (Christianity is the fastest-growing religion in Iran, he adds correctly, despite the death penalty for conversion). Apparently Fate has played a joke on the Ayatollah.