North Korea Confidential: Private Markets, Fashion Trends, Prison Camps, Dissenters and Defectors Hardcover – Illustrated, April 14, 2015

Beyond Kim Jong Un and his predecessors, beyond the secretive nature of the hermit kingdom, beyond the missile launches and the occasional butt of a joke on the internet, there are 24 million ordinary North Koreans with common concerns just like people anywhere else in the world to make money, raise their children, and have a little fun every once in a while.This book gives a rare glimpse into what this world really looks like, with impressive details and a tone of writing that switches back and forth between what feels like a Lonely Planet travel guide and The Economist in-dept investigation.The authors, Daniel Tudor (The Economist’s Korea correspondent) and James Pearson (Reuters’ Korea correspondent), gather their research materials from interviews with Pyongyang’s government insider, diplomats, NGOs, cross-border traders and defectors, as well as written accounts in Korean, English and Chinese. And if that still doesn’t convinced you, they only use reliable claims made by 3 or more separate and credible sources to produce an honest view on the reality of life in North Korean society today.The book started out by introducing the structure of the economy, where there are practically 2 functioning types of economy in North Korea: 1. The government controlled, which serves as the front or the face of the ruling regime that international observers see from outside, and 2. The real underground capitalist economy that consist of black markets and network of bribes that actually runs the country.It is very interesting to read about how despite the oppression from the central government, capitalism can spring up naturally underground. For instance, while the average North Korean breadwinners still have official jobs in state-owned factories, they also increasingly make a living from private trade using business stalls in the black market, or Jangmadang, which interestingly are paid by people chipping in together in a shareholders kind of scheme.Another fascinating observation is the market mechanism for the black market prices, as the authors describes, “Rice traders, for instance, (illegally) monitor foreign radio in order to find out in advance about aid shipments into North Korea. If a shipment is on its way, the market price of rice will fall due to the expectation of increased supply—and the race is then on to sell up before everyone else finds out. A big incoming supply of fertilizer will have a similar impact on the market, as it will have the effect of increasing rice production.”Moreover, in an utter contravention of the government's wishes, thanks to these black markets people can now enjoy listening to South Korean pop music, as well as watching South Koreans TV shows obtained from China in the format of DVD, Micro SD card, or USB stick. And when they do get caught in possession of these goods, unlike in the olden days when they will be severely punished, today they simply pay a bribe and can walk away free.Indeed, while it seems that the country looks like a dictatorship with an iron fist rule and strict law enforcements, in truth corruption is rampant and it is what makes the underground capitalist economy works, where Chinese Yuan, US dollar or even a pack of cigarette act as the currency of choice for bribing the officials (and quite often they became familiar with one another and treat the bribes as normal fee money). In other words, the real North Korea is a society governed by unofficial cash and connections.The main shift towards this more lenient North Korea is actually a tragic one: the 1990s famine where several hundred thousand people died. It weakened the bond between the state and the people, which then forced the average North Korean to survive on themselves without the help of the government. As a result, the government is now just one part of a quasi-capitalist market economy instead of the sole coordinator of economy that it once was.And actually, even the government itself has unofficial illicit businesses, using complex smuggling techniques pioneered by drug trafficking organisations to conceal the movement of small arms, nuclear weapons or missile component, as well as luxury goods, and using a complicated financial countermeasures to mask its transactions from international watchdog and to make their way around international sanctions. All of which involved complex corporate ecosystem of foreign-based firms and individuals, as well as the North Korean embassy.Moreover, what’s happening in the economic front is also happening in the political structure, where today Kim Jong Un does not actually impose an absolute power that we thought a dictator would have. At least not like his father Kim Kong Il. And instead, they have an incredibly complex structure inside the party. As per the authors, “Viewed from the outside, the government of North Korea appears as a monolith in which all power is invested in Kim Jong Un, an omnipotent boy-tyrant who threatens the world with nuclear weapons, and executes his uncle—while still enjoying the adulation of his brainwashed subjects. Internally, however, what lies beneath the uniformed and “single-hearted” image of the state is a collection of competing factions and power-brokers who jockey for political control, influence, and money.”And this shadow power structure was actually set up by Kim Jong Il, in the form of Jojik-Jidobu (or Organization and Guidance Department - OGD). As the authors remark, “those who consider the execution of Jang Song Thaek [the uncle] to be Kim’s work would do well to know that the OGD had far more to gain from it. At the same time, the OGD is no ordinary organization—it is headless, and to further add to the confusion, some of its members are not even “real OGD.”So what exactly is this “headless” organization? “The OGD has existed since 1946,” the authors explain, “but its role was reinvented following Kim Jong Il ’s accession to its directorship in 1973, when he began to use it as the main means by which to take control of the state. The OGD since then has risen to become the central hub of power in North Korea.” The OGD today consists of 9 deputy directors but no director since Kim Jong Il passed away and the succession of power to Kim Jong Un wasn’t completed before his father died (hence the OGD remains “headless”). The 2 most powerful deputy directors in OGD are Hwang Pyong So (in charge of military affairs) and Kim Kyong Ok (surveillance), with the rest are in charge of the Supreme Leader’s personal secretariat.Even the generals fear the OGD, because military guidance comes through the General Political Bureau, and General Political Bureau answers to OGD Section 13, as ordained by Kim Jong Il in 1992 in a speech to senior officers. But the OGD does not issue policy, that’s the Supreme Leader’s job where his words is quite literally the law: “if Kim Jong Il said to an aide, “women should be made to wear traditional Korean dress,” then the aide would note this down, and it would become a policy.” But then it is the OGD that is processing and documenting the note and implements the new law to various branches of the state.The authors summarize it pretty neatly: “Today’s DPRK is best considered a formally unstructured coalition composed of Kim Jong Un and his close relatives, senior OGD members such as Hwang Pyong So and Kim Kyong Ok, and any high-ranking military or party officials who have their trust. In that sense, North Korea has something in common with other countries. The DPRK has an identifiable figurehead, but behind him stand a layer of powerful people with interests and inclinations that do not necessarily always match. If a “hard-line” policy is followed by a “reformist” one, or a “rising star” is suddenly pushed out, it does not mean that “absolute dictator” Kim Jong Un is mercurial and unpredictable. It means that neither he, nor any one other individual, is in full control.”Furthermore, the book is not all economics and politics as it clearly attempts to paint a balanced picture on North Korea as a whole. For example, there are chapters dedicated on fashion and leisure where once again shows the softening grip from the regime: while there are strict code for fashion and style, which is enforced by fashion police, women close to the Chinese borders now wear skinny jeans and can get away with it despite it being technically illegal to wear. And when anyone seek out romantic liaisons outside marriage, which is illegal in North Korea, they now have their version of South Korea's "love motel" but in a more discreet place: at someone's home for an hour of two. And like their cousins in the South, people in North Korea are big on drinking alcohol in social gatherings. Even Kim Jong Un himself is suspected as a drinker who loves to have parties, as well as a smoker who struggles to quit.But there is still one area where most ordinary North Koreans cannot enjoy freely, even in black market: travel. As the authors explain, “It is illegal for DPRK citizens to travel to places outside of their region, except where permission is given. And even when permission is given, the terrible infrastructure makes the journey long and arduous. It is no exaggeration to say that North Korea had a better overall railway system 80 years ago; power cuts and breakdowns can make a single cross-country journey last a week.” As a result, the idea of foreign travel is still far away from reality, most cannot even travel to other region within the country simply because they’re not allowed to.This evidently shows that North Korea is still a brutal regime that oppresses its citizens. This is reconfirmed in the crime and punishment chapter in the book that shows the cruelty of the regime, including the caste system based on your family’s loyalty to the Kim family and the infamous prison camps filled with some political prisoners, some real criminals like murderers, but some only there because of being blood-related with, for example, someone who gives a snark comment on the dear leader.Yes, the brainwashing to worship the Kim family is true and still very much in practice today. What’s intriguing for me is how Kim Il Sung wasn’t even supposed to be the first dictator of North Korea, as the leader of the Korean Communist Party during the war was Pak Hon Yong, but Kim Il Sung somehow managed to eliminate Yong to eventually become the supreme leader. The book also shows that it wasn’t a smooth succession either from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il, with plenty of in-fightings occurred within the family, just like Kim Jong Un notoriously killed his own step brother Kim Jong Nam to secure the succession.All these infightings and loosening grip on power begs the ultimate question: with all these iron fist brutality and lesser control over the social and economic aspects of the country, will the regime stay on power for much longer or will it eventually collapse? The authors are doubtful about its demise because the key political control is still intact, while any challenge to it is met with extreme ruthlessness. And those powerful people with vested interest are not looking to undermine the system either, while with China’s massive support and interest for the regime there is little incentive for the US and South Korea to even contemplate attacking North Korea.But if there is ever going to be a change in the country the authors suspect that it would likely begins from the underground capitalist system, like it’s already going on in a small scale. But the fact of the matter is, we just don’t know what the future lies for them. Thus, the country remains one of the most closely monitored and anticipated in the world. And thanks to this book we now have a better understanding over its complete picture.

The outside world doesn't know much about life inside North Korea. Except for defectors' accounts, authoritative stories are hard to come by as high-ranking officials won't talk for fear of retaliation by the Government. In "North Korea Confidential: Private Markets, Fashion Trends, Prison Camps, Dissenters and Defectors," authors Daniel Tudo and James Pearson give a rare glimpse of life inside the closed nation. They have unique vantage points and perspectives. Tudor lives in South Korea and is a noted authority on life behind the border. Pearson is a foreign correspondent for Reuters in Seoul.The book confirms some of the things that we have known. North Korea is a poor nation and tightly ruled by the government. But despite what we may have heard, the North Korean people are not all happy with the leadership of "Dear Leader" Kim Jong Un. They have found ways of getting around the government's rules, including the establishment of an underground economy. One of my biggest takeaways was learning about the spirit and resilience of its citizens.I thoroughly enjoyed this book and recommend it to anyone interested in North Korea’s future relationship with the United States and other countries..Other highlights of the book:The main cause of North Korea's recent social change is actually a tragic one: the famine of the mid 1990s, in which at least several hundred thousand people perished. The famine greatly weakened the bond between the state and the people, forcing the average North Korean to fend for him or herself. As a result, the government is now just one part of a quasi-capitalist market economy, rather than the sole coordinator of economic activity that it once wasPrivate trade has become so prevalent in recent years that it permeates all levels of society, from the poorest through to the Party and military elites.The horrific famine of the mid-1990s was the turning point. Regular, government-supplied food rations all but disappeared during this period, and never fully returned. The lesson that survivors took from this experience was one of self-reliance—not the self-reliance of Juche ideology, but rather self-reliance through by-hook-or-by-crook capitalism. Private property and private trade remain illegal, but for post-famine North Korea, there is but one real economic rule: don't follow the rules. Sixty-two percent of defectors surveyed in 2010 stated that they had engaged in work other than their official jobs before leaving North Korea, and a thriving gray market that uses unofficial currency exchange rates is now the de facto way of setting prices, even for the elite.The North Korean economy, in fact, performed quite well throughout the late 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s. The North's command economy was stronger than the South's state-capitalist model on a GDP per capita basis until around 1973.There was one other crucial factor in that initial success: Soviet and Chinese aid. Throughout the Cold War era, North Korea was able to exploit the rift between China and the Soviet Union by cleverly playing the two against each other. In this "love triangle" relationship, North Korea would carefully seek benefits from both Beijing and Moscow, turning its weakness as a "shrimp between whales" into an assetHowever, the decline and then total cessation of Soviet help—plus growing economic mismanagement under Kim Jong Il—began to put the PDS in jeopardy.The result was a serious famine between 1994 and 1998 that claimed the lives of between 200,000 and three million North Koreans.Crucially, the famine also empowered North Korean women to aspire to be more than just homemakers, many becoming the real breadwinners of the North Korean family unit. It is mostly women who run market stalls, sell food, engage in small-scale import–export, or rent out the family home by the hour to courting couples. All this, in turn, is having a dramatic impact on the role of women in society, and even on the rate of divorce.There are occasional crackdowns on marketplaces, for instance. And in 2009 came the bluntest move of all. That November, it was announced that the national currency, the North Korean won, would be redenominated via the cancellation of the last two zeroes on every banknote. A 1,000 won note needed to be exchanged for a new 10 won note, and so on. Citizens were given one week to trade in their old zero-heavy notes for new ones. Similarly, a bank deposit of 100,000 won became 1,000 won at a stroke.All workers, officially at least, are employed by the state—and they are paid in accordance with the official value of the won. Civil servants, for instance, usually earn in the range of 1,000–6,000 won per month. At an official rate of 96 won per US dollar, that would already be bad enough—but when one considers the "real" gray market exchange rate, even a highly-ranked official is being paid less than US$1 per month.Just as North Korea has two exchange rates, it effectively has two economies: the "official" economy (where people work in state jobs and are paid a state salary) and a "gray market" economy, where people earn money in ways that are not strictly legal, but widely tolerated. The latter is the one that really counts in today's North Korea. The term used for the illegal, yet tolerated, markets in North Korea is jangmadang, an old-fashioned Korean word that literally translates as "marketplace"It is no surprise, then, that jangmadang traders in North Korea are usually female. There is an additional reason that the ajumma dominates the jangmadang. In North Korea, adults are assigned to work units, to serve the state in return for pitiful salaries. Married women, however, are exempted from this. This means they are free to work as market traders.But what do jangmadang traders sell? As may be expected, there is a focus on the basics. North Korean cigarettes go fairly cheaply, but more sought-after Chinese and Russian cigarettes can cost anything from 2,000 (US$0.25) to 20,000 (US$2.50) depending on the brand. A bar of chocolate costs around 3,000 (US$0.38), and a kilogram of rice costs around 5,000 (US$0.63) Imperialist American Coca-Cola is very much available, and goes for 6,000 per can—about US$0.75, not far from what it would cost in a supermarket anywhere else.t can even be dangerous to not be a trader. Middle- and high-income families that are not known to be actively engaged in business are at risk of being investigated by the authorities. Such a family would be assumed to have a less "tolerable" source of income, such as cash transfers from defector relatives living in South Korea. There have actually been many instances of people informing the authorities about neighbors who have money but no obvious business interests. This has led to the ironic situation of some North Koreans being observed pretending to be engaged in capitalism in order to avoid suspicion.The consumption of foreign media is punishable by law in the DPRK. But that does not mean that nobody consumes it. According to a 2010 survey,2 around half of 250 North Korean defectors questioned said they had seen foreign television or movies, and many officials in Pyongyang will privately admit the same.Television and radio sets sold in North Korea come with presets tuned to state-owned broadcasters like Korean Central Television (KCTV), the Korean Educational and Cultural Network, or the Pyongyang-only Mansudae TV. A TV set legally sold in North Korea cannot access anything else—unless one is prepared to break the law and tamper with it.Direct reception of Chinese or South Korean television is dwarfed by the importation of movies and TV series via China, on both DVD and USB memory sticks. The DVD became commonplace in North Korea in the mid-2000s, and since roughly 2010, the USB stick has taken offThe USB stick has certain major advantages over a DVD. First of all, the contents of a USB stick can be endlessly copied and distributed. They are also safer. One old method the authorities used to crack down on viewers of foreign TV and movies was to cut the electricity to a building, and then sweep through it, prizing open DVD players to see what people were watching. Of course, one cannot easily remove a disc if the player is not switched on. But tiny USB sticks can simply be removed in a second, and easily hidden.Through surveillance and the re-routing of information and reporting structures, the OGD (Organization and Guidance Department) has come to be the only part of the state that sees and knows everything. The OGD has existed since 1946, but its role was reinvented following Kim Jong Il's accession to its directorship in 1973, when he began to use it as the main means by which to take control of the state.10 The OGD since then has risen to become the central hub of power in North Korea. It possesses a file on "anyone who is anyone"; it is the conduit via which the various branches of government communicate with the Supreme Leader, passing instructions down and information up; it is responsible for implementing and enforcing policy; it runs a network of spies that reach from the highest army general to the lowest provincial factory manager; it "signs off" on any government or military appointment; and it is essentially in charge of the personal security and well-being of the ruling family.It is well-known that the DPRK operates prison camps that can rival in cruelty anything the twentieth century could offer. Prisoners spend "half the day doing forced labor, and the other half receiving propaganda education," according to a source. The state's intention here is to re-indoctrinate the prisoner before returning them to society. Discipline at a rodong danryondae is strict, and violence is common. Security, however, is relatively light, and escapes do occur.Consequently, an old Korean method of dealing with one's enemies is making a comeback. Though the DPRK has long exile d political "criminals" to the remote countryside, such a punishment is growing in frequency today. The system is a very simple one. Enemies of the state are taken up to the mountains and left there with nothing. It is expected that they will die there. Though the authors know of no evidence relating to this, it is presumably the case that those who make their way down into a town or village can be punished severely if caught, since they do not possess the permit to be there. North Korea also has a number of uninhabited islands, and it is said that one can be punished by being exiled to one.Despite the common perception that "crazy" Pyongyang could stage a nuclear attack on South Korea or even the United States, the leadership has absolutely no incentive to consider such a suicidal action. The DPRK leadership may be many things, but irrational is not one of them. Furthermore, the US and South Korea also have obvious disincentives against ever attacking North Korea—the most important being the DPRK's nuclear program and Chinese support for the status quo.The authors therefore believe that the most likely scenario for North Korea in the short and medium term is the gradual opening of the country under the rule of the current regime. But North Korea, this profit-driven, feudalistic, traditional Korean "socialist paradise," has long had the power to surprise. No-one really knows what the North Korea of 10 or 20 years hence will look like. In the meantime, we continue to watch with a mixture of frustration and hope

It reads more like a report of loose facts without a narrative to make a homogeneous representation what North Korea represents. This makes for very dull reading indeed. For one somewhat familiar with North Korea through reading, this book does not offer any insights nor information that are new or revealing. There is plenty of redundant text through repetition, making it heftier than what it really is. I was very disappointed.

Although this came highly recommended, I was disappointed with the content and the Kindle version of the book.The first chapter was excellent but the quality quickly declined; there was considerable repetition and the editing was sloppy. There are constant mentions of how 'everything changed after the mid-1990s famine', which makes the reader hope for an informed analysis of that event but is left unsatisfied. Instead, there are frequent digressions on South Korea which typically provide little additional understanding of the North. Some discussions are so simplistic, it reads as though the author is lecturing a small child. This all leaves a feeling that the book is padded, which is not desirable in such a short work (apparently 224 printed pages, perhaps 150 after the photos/references/etc are removed). A good editor could have easily condensed this work to <100 pages, without losing any important information. Most frustratingly, extensive footnotes are provided but many claims are unsupported. The reader is unable to discern whether a claim is based on evidence, information from defectors/insiders, or the author's own assumptions/beliefs, and it is impossible to make decisions about the content's reliability.The Kindle version suffered from some technical errors (some sections are simply cut off, mid-sentence, with the heading for another section) and the placement of footnotes at the end of each chapter, rather than the end of the book, meant tedious scrolling through pages and the 'time left' feature was unreliable. The placement of a picture section in the middle makes sense with a physical book, where different paper must be used, but is confusing in a Kindle book, where it divides a chapter (and sentence).Overall, I found the book overpriced (A$13) for the content and that it failed to provide an informed, insightful analysis on North Korea's marketisation.

The most up-to-date book about North Korea. It is refreshing to read about the impact of USB sticks, tablets, or mobiles. However, the book is just painfully sterile. Not a single human story, it's more like a sociology study. I would have preferred to learn more about the human beings behind all this information.

I have read a few books on N. K. This book gave me an understanding of the resilience, inovativness and courage of the average citizen despite the gruesome living conditions and personal dangers from theAuthorities and snoopers. Want to get some understanding of N.K people? Then get this book.

This is a highly readable book giving a comprehensive and at times very surprising insights into life in today's North Korea, from the fashion-following, tablet-wielding denizens of Pyongyang, to the central importance of the jangmajang markets for individuals making their own way utterly apart from the state's desperate meddling, to the horrific menace of the state security apparatus. That said, the book outlines the extent to which money has replaced and undermined the structures of loyalty and surveillance in the 20 years following the famine, and this book neatly bookends the country's development since the 1990s' famine that Demyck covers so well in Nothing To Envy.