Thucydides: The Reinvention of History

I have read and re-read Donald Kagan’s four-volume history of the Peloponnesian War and, to most who have read that outstanding work, his book on Thucydides will be disappointing. For someone who has not read either that full history of the war or its one-volume condensed version, it is a concise summary of Kagan’s view on the standing of Thucydides as a historian and a critique of his methods. However, large sections of the text are lifted straight from his earlier works with, at most, minor corrections. The Introduction and the Conclusion, apart from being repeats of earlier works and other concerns, have as much to do with Kagan’s own political views as with Thucydides.On a positive note, the nine chapters forming the body of the book set out Kagan’s view that Thucydides was a revisionist who tried to contradict views about the war held by many of his contemporaries. Although Thucydides claimed to be impartial, Kagan shows he was sometimes deliberately misleading in his presentation and that those generally-held views were more likely to be correct than Thucydides’ revisions. These include his attempting to minimise the responsibility of Pericles for starting the Peloponnesian War and proposing a strategy that had to succeed quickly or bankrupt Athens, ignoring the successes of later leaders who abandoned Pericles’ strategy or attributing them as mere chance and minimising the responsibility of Nicias, whose policies followed those of Pericles, for the disaster in Sicily. However, although Kagan provides some background information, these issues were probably better considered in the context of a narrative of the events they relate to, as they were in Kagan’s history of the war, rather than in isolation.On the other hand, the volumes of Kagan’s history of the war were published up to 40 years ago, long before the contributions of more recent researchers. The passages recycled from his earlier works are not modified on account of later interpretations, so the whole does not present a coherent and considered final opinion. The period from the late 1960s to the 2000s was also that when Kagan began to express his defence of history as a search for the truth through detailed and objective research, not just to explain events, but also to provide examples, give warnings and indicate likely developments in human affairs by reference to the past: the approach first adopted by Thucydides. Just as Kagan shows that Thucydides had an agenda, Kagan’s agenda is a plea for politics, wars and diplomacy to be studied as the central themes of history rather than just trivial and short-term compared to the society, economy and geography of the peoples and places studied.Kagan regrets that social and economic history is replacing political history as the proper object for the study of history. His history of the Peloponnesian War is an outstanding contribution to the form of historical enquiry on which he has spent his career. This cut-and-paste consideration of Thucydides is, however, hardly the best support for his advocacy of political history.

It is a revised edition in some part with the same words and figures of the book "The pelloponesian war". Practically a book focusing only some aspect of the war. Because is smaller more easy to hand!!

Kagan's well-written account of Thucydides reaffirms why he is rightly seen as the father of history. Kagan explains how Thucydides gathered his information, how he cross-checked his facts, and how he tried to maintain objectivity, as any modern historian would.

Not as good as Kagan's superlative The Peloponnesian War book but only because of the subject matter; wars are, for most I suspect, inherently more exciting than arguing historical fact.The twist here is that Kagan does what Thucydides did to his predecessors; he argues convincingly against the ancient historian's interpretation of the Peloponnesian War, thereby "re-inventing history". Donald Kagan's writing style is both elegant and concise as one who has read The Peloponnesian War might expect. However, if you have not read that then get it, read it and then come back and get this one.

If you are reading either or both of the above courses this makes an excellent companion. It gives additional context that cannot be covered in the course collateral - beautifully written and a superb accessory to any serious student or enthusiast.

Thucydides: The Reinvention of History, Donald Kagan, Penguin, 2010 (2009), 257ppThis book by the current eminent historian of the Peloponnesian War is about the first great study of that war, written by the pre-eminent historian of the subject, Thucydides. Professor Kagan raises the issue of `hidden agendas' is Thucydides' work, and how Thucydides didn't actually hide them as such, merely left certain things unsaid or un-emphasised, which modern historians, if they chose to examine them in more detail, can use to reinterpret what Thucydides appeared to be saying. The Professor is not the first to do such a thing, for I read recently a study of the campaign of King Agis of Sparta against Mantinea, published in 1933, which both Thucydides and Kagan dismiss quite briefly - whereas Professor Woodhouse dissects the campaign and Thucydides' brief account of it in a book almost two-thirds the size of this one, and an excellent and highly recommended one it is:  King Agis of Sparta and His Campaign in Arkadia in 418 B.C. . In the current book, Professor Kagan discusses several of Thucydides' attempts to shape opinion on such aspects of the war as -Periclean Strategy - an `Anaconda Plan' which when it showed no short term results, was abandoned when military victories appeared to offer a quicker solutionAthenian Democracy - Thucydides did not approve of the `populist' type of democracy in force, and wanted to show that it had a negative effect on the Athenians' direction of the warThucydides' own part in the loss of AmphipolisThat the `demagogue' Cleon was a bad influence on Athenian war aims, a poor general and a personal coward, despite being a successful commander - this being the leader who had Thucydides exiled for his part in the loss of Amphipolis...The Causes and Blame for the Sicilian Expedition - Athenian demagoguery, rather than incompetent and selfish generals (who Thucydides happened to support)Professor Kagan points out that although Thucydides appears to bias his account of events to support his own theories (apart from Cleon's alleged cowardice), he doesn't actually lie about events, merely under emphasises certain aspects, and that counterbalancing information can be found or deduced from Thucydides' own writing.This is an extremely interesting book, if you are interested in the Peloponnesian War and its prime historical source; though if you know little or nothing about it, you may be confused by some of the discussions, as you will not have the full background to relate them to.The Contents are -P001: IntroductionP023: Thucydides the RevisionistP035: Causes of the War - CorcyraP058: Causes of the War - From Corcyra to the Megarian DecreeP075: The Strategy of PericlesP098: Was Periclean Athens a Democracy?P115: Cleon's Lucky Victory at PylosP140: Thucydides and Cleon at AmphipolisP162: The Decision for a Sicilian ExpeditionP188: Who was Responsible for the Sicilian Disaster?P223: ConclusionP335: NotesP247: Index