George BerkeleyA Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Hackett Classics)

Berkeley is important and interesting. But this low-budget edition needed editorial work — e.g., two words printed as one, peculiar use of hyphens, etc. Still quite readable, though.

This work was the first I’d ever read by George Berkeley.In this treatise, Berkeley expounds on his theory of immaterialism. This basically states that no material thing exists outside of that which perceives it and bears no relation whatsoever to solipsism—the belief that only the self exists.Berkeley was a deeply religious man who believed that nature and matter did not exist without being perceived in consciousness; that this perception was an idea instilled in the spirits of men through the infinite all-perceiving mind of God. Therefore, the revelation of God as the very originator of creation is available to anyone not bound by the notion of material existence outside of consciousness.From a materialist, purely Cartesian, Newtonian perspective, his ingenious works might seem ludicrous. There were no physicists at the time to chime in with theories of quantum physics that so readily collapse the foundations of materialism. Berkeley stood his ground alone.The prose is bloated and bombastic, but let’s not forget the text was written in 1710, and compared to other writings of his time, his was simple and straight to the point.A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE is a treasure to anyone with a spiritual or religious inclination. The message is as deep as it is subtle, and can be quite transformative if you allow its transcendental logic the benefit of a truly open mind.

Good quality

This man was brilliant. Whether you agree with everything he wrote or not, reading his work is enlightening. Peruse it carefully and deliberately. It is no wonder Kant and Hume were so influenced by him.

Good

Far fetched but explains with great detail Immaterialism.

Berkeley's treatise is hopelessly opportunistic and naive and cannot be taken seriously, at least insofar as it deals with mathematics and science (which it does quite extensively). I propose to prove as much by two examples.As our first example of Berkeley's childishly simplistic crusade on science we may consider his rejection of absolute space. Newton of course presented his famous bucket argument in favour of the theory of absolute space. Berkeley proposes to weasel out of this argument by redefining the concept of relative motion in a very opportunistic manner:"To denominate a body moved, it is requisite, first, that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other body; and secondly, that the force or action occasioning that change be applied to it." (§115)In Newton's theory, of course, such a separation of force and motion is impossible, since force and acceleration are interdefinable (F=ma). So apparently Berkeley has some other mysterious notion of "force" in mind, which he does not specify. All we know about Berkeley's concept of "force" is that apparently it is somehow logically prior to motion: before we can tell if an object is moving or not we must first decide if there is a "force" acting on it. Since Berkeley gives no indication of how to determine whether or not forces are present, his pseudo-definition of motion amounts to this: "an object is moving if and only if I, George Berkeley, self-absorbed dilettante, say so."If we turn to Berkeley's discussion of geometry we again find nothing but unsubstantiated posturing. For example, Berkeley rejects infinite divisibility in favour of a sort of geometrical atomism:"There is no such thing as a ten-thousandth part of an inch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth ... The ten-thousandth part of that [one-inch] line ... is nothing at all, and consequently may be neglected without any error" (§127).This idea, claims Berkeley, "at once clears the science of geometry from a great number of difficulties and contradictions ... which render the study of mathematics so difficult and tedious" (§123). For while infinite divisibility has always been "thought to have so inseparable and essential an connexion with the principles and demonstrations in geometry" (§123), this is a mistake, and, in fact, according to Berkeley, "whatever is useful in geometry ... doth still remain firm and unshaken on our principles" (§131).All of this is arrogantly asserted without a trace of an argument; which is no wonder since it is such madness. Infinite divisibility is not "thought" to be essential to geometry, it plainly is so. Berkeley's rejection of this principle essentially nullifies every single geometrical proof that has ever been devised, while of course leaving us completely in the dark as to how "whatever is useful in geometry" is supposed to survive this geometrical armageddon. As an example, it is easy to see that Berkeley's claim entails the rejection of Euclid's axiom that a line is determined by two points: consider an equilateral triangle ABC with sides that are divisible into ten thousand parts; now take a line segment DE that is not divisible into ten thousand parts and place it parallel to the base AB and touching the other sides AC and BC; now divide AB into ten thousand parts and let F and G be two points one ten-thousandth apart; then, according to Berkeley, since DE is not divisible into such parts, the lines FC and GC both go through the same point H of DE; thus the points C and H do not uniquely determine a line.

This is not the place for a philosophical analysis of Berkeley's original text, and its content of argument. The review concerns the specific book edited by Dancy, and its worth in respect of its further contribution to understanding the Treatise.This book is to be strongly recommended as it provides a multitude of resources that contextualise, criticise, and clarify, the positions put forward by Berkeley in this work.The most substantial contribution is the extensive introduction comprised of 15 punchy sections, covering Berkeley's life, his academic heritage, and analysis of his thought (both internal and external to that given in the Treatise). Dancy is fair to Berkeley in setting forth the most robust defences of his position, and marshalling critical arguments against the Berkelian stance. This is supplemented by an extremely thorough set of endnotes that are continually present in the background of the text, offering detailed guidance whenever necessary, or desired.Additionally, the book offers a summarised concise overview of the arguments provided in the Treatise, a glossary of archaic terms(!), and a very helpful short section entitled "How to use this book" (why don't more books include this sort of thing?). There is also a manageable annotated bibliography of further reading to trail a path for academic expansion.Overall, I found that this book provided a systematic treatment of the text and provided a solid structure of support surrounding the subject. Also included, the letters between Berkeley and Johnson, provide an unexpected bonus. This book is relatively cheap, considering its breadth and depth. In my opinion, it is an ideal text through which to study (and enjoy) Berkeley's Treatise.

Fascinating book. Good quality, fair price.

This is a great version of Berkeley's text, and Dancy has written a very helpful introduction. I have two other books by Dancy, which are intellectually substantial but can be difficult to get into and at times are challenging reads. In this case, his introduction contains a powerful and accessible analysis. Dancy's introduction is interesting, and directly useful to anyone at an undergraduate level facing the challenge of writing good essays on Berkeley. If you just want Berkeley's text you can get a cheaper version of the book, but if you want something more helpful this version is well worth the additional cost.

Libro importante en el desarrollo del pensamiento, pero hoy aporta poco en comparación con lo que se escribió y pensó posteriormente. Valioso para evaluar la evolución del pensamiento filosófico.