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# Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety

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Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety [Schlosser, Eric] on desertcart.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety

Review: If This Book Doesn't Scare You, You Must Be Brain-Dead - Eric Schlosser's "Command and Control" is a GREAT book. Every American--nay, every citizen of any country who is concerned about the hole we've dug ourselves with our unending pursuit of ever-more-powerful means of mass destruction--should read it. It's one of the most well written, compelling and important books I've read in years. Scrupulously accurate, extremely well footnoted and powerfully told in a fast-paced, highly readable style, "Command and Control" presents two stories in interleaved narratives, which basically flip back-and-forth in alternate sections. One narrative tells the history of America's development of nuclear weapons and the means to deploy and control them, and, perhaps more importantly, to assure none of them could detonate accidentally. The other narrative is the story of the accident in Titan II ICBM silo 374-7, near Damascus, Arkansas, on September 18, 1980, when a worker dropped a socket that punctured the missile's first-stage fuel tank and resulted, eventually, in a huge (but non-nuclear) explosion. I already knew quite a bit about nuclear weapons development, but Mr. Schlosser provides an excellent refresher course. Readers unfamiliar with that history should find those parts of his book very informative and technically fascinating. I knew little about the Damascus "Broken Arrow," though, and, thanks to his use of copious reference sources and exclusive interviews, I have no doubt that Mr. Schlosser totally nails that story, which he relates in exceptional detail and in an almost minute-by-minute chronology. We normally think of "command and control" in the big-picture sense. For example, how do we know for sure whether the nation is under attack, and how do we mobilize military forces in an appropriate response if it is. Perhaps the ultimate "command and control" icon is the "football" (actually an innocuous briefcase) that accompanies the President of the United States everywhere, and that contains the means to command (and, hopefully, to control) the nation's nuclear forces in the event of an attack. But there's another, small-scale aspect of command and control that becomes clear in Mr. Schlosser's book. It is that aspect that should frighten everyone with the mental capacity to think beyond the next minute. The response to the Damascus accident illustrated that there was very little meaningful command and control even at the lowest levels of the military and civilian organizations that were trying to deal with the crisis. For example, people who really needed to talk to each other couldn't because their radio systems used different frequencies or weren't compatible. Tools that were supposed to be stored in certain locations weren't there. A key door that should have opened didn't because someone secured an interlocked door in the wrong position. Protective suits had rips and would not seal properly. Critical valves did not operate because they had corroded. The entire disaster response, as Mr. Schlosser documents in chilling detail, was a textbook example of Murphy's Law at its most perverse. Consider the nuclear reactor meltdowns at Chernobyl, Three Mile Island and Fukushima Dai Ichi as other examples of what Murphy's Law, combined with inevitable human errors, can wreak, and every thinking person should be very concerned about what surprises our technology may hold for us in the future. "Command and Control" shows what happened in a situation involving America's most powerful thermonuclear weapon that had never happened before. How many other technological Armageddons await, undetected and unplanned-for, in the world, and how many of them will stop short of utter disaster, as did the Damascus accident, only by dumb luck? Are we willing to trust the future of life on this planet to luck? Read "Command and Control" and think about it.
Review: Training the Nuclear Dragon - I recall watching President John F. Kennedy's television address on October 22, 1962 when he announced a blockade of Cuba and issued an ultimatum to the USSR to remove all nuclear weapons from that island. Simultaneously, an order went out to the armed forces of the United States placing them on alert at the Defcon 3 level. The next 13 days arguably were the most frightening in the history of the world as we and the Soviets seemed to teeter on the brink of all out nuclear war. Had that war broken out many millions of people on both sides, and in the middle, would have perished and civilization would have been devastated, perhaps beyond recovery. At that time, there were no graduated options for the use of nuclear weapons. It was all or nothing. Once one side fired off its missiles the other would have to launch all of its nukes to ensure that they would not be eliminated by the enemy's incoming warheads. Command and Control is about how the systems employed to safeguard against accidental or malicious nuclear catastrophe evolved. The story of the Cuban Missile Crisis is well known. Less well known are the facts about the many incidents that came close to resulting in a nuclear accident or an unplanned launch of targeted atomic and or hydrogen weapons against the Soviet Union. Nuclear bombs fell from planes onto land and into oceans. False alerts generated by training tapes inadvertently being broadcast over early missile-control systems and from early-warning systems mistaking natural phenomena for an incoming missile attack provoked high-level preparations to launch our ICBMs. A socket dropped accidentally in a missile silo in Arkansas caused a leak that ultimately led to the explosion of the Titan missile it contained sending the nuclear warhead high into the air before it landed, fortunately unexploded, several hundred yards away. It may seem reassuring that, despite all of the mishaps described in the book, none of the nuclear warheads involved ever detonated as a result of an accident. Seemingly, the "fail safe" mechanisms worked. But, as they say in the world of investing, "Past performance is no guarantee of future results." Disaster was averted but only narrowly in many cases, as Schlosser reports. Methods for making nuclear weapons safer to handle were developed but implementation was successfully opposed for decades by the military, who feared that the safety features would render the weapons less reliable. Most of the action in Command and Control takes place from the 1950's to the early 1980's, presumably because much of the information about current and more recent nuclear weapons' issues is still classified. However, the author does devote a few pages in the epilogue to discussing some changes to the command and control structure that would appear to reduce the risk of accidental detonations or the inadvertent launch of missiles. That is reassuring. Less reassuring, however, is that other nations have joined the nuclear club since the early days, including North Korea, whose unpredictable leader regularly brandishes the threat of nuclear attack against South Korea and/or the West. India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, have fought four wars against one another since 1947 and have a long-standing dispute over the Kashmir region, as well as other grievances. The former Soviet Union seems to maintain fairly tight central control over its nuclear arsenal but even less is known publicly about its command and control system and the nuclear accidents that may have occurred in Russia. Schlosser's book is well researched, informative, and very readable and it is written in a non-technical style for a general audience. It is recommended reading for those who are comfortable thinking about the unthinkable and being reminded that the threat of nuclear annihilation, though diminished since the end of the Cold War, still exists and is likely to remain with us for the foreseeable future.

## Technical Specifications

| Specification | Value |
|---------------|-------|
| ASIN  | 0143125788 |
| Best Sellers Rank | #31,404 in Books ( See Top 100 in Books ) #7 in Nuclear Weapons & Warfare History (Books) #11 in Military Policy (Books) #71 in American Military History |
| Customer Reviews | 4.6 4.6 out of 5 stars (4,126) |
| Dimensions  | 5.47 x 1.4 x 8.42 inches |
| Edition  | Reprint |
| ISBN-10  | 9780143125785 |
| ISBN-13  | 978-0143125785 |
| Item Weight  | 2.31 pounds |
| Language  | English |
| Print length  | 656 pages |
| Publication date  | August 26, 2014 |
| Publisher  | Penguin Books |

## Images

![Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety - Image 1](https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/81zJ1c-tG7L.jpg)

## Customer Reviews

### ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ If This Book Doesn't Scare You, You Must Be Brain-Dead
*by T***S on January 26, 2014*

Eric Schlosser's "Command and Control" is a GREAT book. Every American--nay, every citizen of any country who is concerned about the hole we've dug ourselves with our unending pursuit of ever-more-powerful means of mass destruction--should read it. It's one of the most well written, compelling and important books I've read in years. Scrupulously accurate, extremely well footnoted and powerfully told in a fast-paced, highly readable style, "Command and Control" presents two stories in interleaved narratives, which basically flip back-and-forth in alternate sections. One narrative tells the history of America's development of nuclear weapons and the means to deploy and control them, and, perhaps more importantly, to assure none of them could detonate accidentally. The other narrative is the story of the accident in Titan II ICBM silo 374-7, near Damascus, Arkansas, on September 18, 1980, when a worker dropped a socket that punctured the missile's first-stage fuel tank and resulted, eventually, in a huge (but non-nuclear) explosion. I already knew quite a bit about nuclear weapons development, but Mr. Schlosser provides an excellent refresher course. Readers unfamiliar with that history should find those parts of his book very informative and technically fascinating. I knew little about the Damascus "Broken Arrow," though, and, thanks to his use of copious reference sources and exclusive interviews, I have no doubt that Mr. Schlosser totally nails that story, which he relates in exceptional detail and in an almost minute-by-minute chronology. We normally think of "command and control" in the big-picture sense. For example, how do we know for sure whether the nation is under attack, and how do we mobilize military forces in an appropriate response if it is. Perhaps the ultimate "command and control" icon is the "football" (actually an innocuous briefcase) that accompanies the President of the United States everywhere, and that contains the means to command (and, hopefully, to control) the nation's nuclear forces in the event of an attack. But there's another, small-scale aspect of command and control that becomes clear in Mr. Schlosser's book. It is that aspect that should frighten everyone with the mental capacity to think beyond the next minute. The response to the Damascus accident illustrated that there was very little meaningful command and control even at the lowest levels of the military and civilian organizations that were trying to deal with the crisis. For example, people who really needed to talk to each other couldn't because their radio systems used different frequencies or weren't compatible. Tools that were supposed to be stored in certain locations weren't there. A key door that should have opened didn't because someone secured an interlocked door in the wrong position. Protective suits had rips and would not seal properly. Critical valves did not operate because they had corroded. The entire disaster response, as Mr. Schlosser documents in chilling detail, was a textbook example of Murphy's Law at its most perverse. Consider the nuclear reactor meltdowns at Chernobyl, Three Mile Island and Fukushima Dai Ichi as other examples of what Murphy's Law, combined with inevitable human errors, can wreak, and every thinking person should be very concerned about what surprises our technology may hold for us in the future. "Command and Control" shows what happened in a situation involving America's most powerful thermonuclear weapon that had never happened before. How many other technological Armageddons await, undetected and unplanned-for, in the world, and how many of them will stop short of utter disaster, as did the Damascus accident, only by dumb luck? Are we willing to trust the future of life on this planet to luck? Read "Command and Control" and think about it.

### ⭐⭐⭐⭐ Training the Nuclear Dragon
*by A***Y on August 26, 2014*

I recall watching President John F. Kennedy's television address on October 22, 1962 when he announced a blockade of Cuba and issued an ultimatum to the USSR to remove all nuclear weapons from that island. Simultaneously, an order went out to the armed forces of the United States placing them on alert at the Defcon 3 level. The next 13 days arguably were the most frightening in the history of the world as we and the Soviets seemed to teeter on the brink of all out nuclear war. Had that war broken out many millions of people on both sides, and in the middle, would have perished and civilization would have been devastated, perhaps beyond recovery. At that time, there were no graduated options for the use of nuclear weapons. It was all or nothing. Once one side fired off its missiles the other would have to launch all of its nukes to ensure that they would not be eliminated by the enemy's incoming warheads. Command and Control is about how the systems employed to safeguard against accidental or malicious nuclear catastrophe evolved. The story of the Cuban Missile Crisis is well known. Less well known are the facts about the many incidents that came close to resulting in a nuclear accident or an unplanned launch of targeted atomic and or hydrogen weapons against the Soviet Union. Nuclear bombs fell from planes onto land and into oceans. False alerts generated by training tapes inadvertently being broadcast over early missile-control systems and from early-warning systems mistaking natural phenomena for an incoming missile attack provoked high-level preparations to launch our ICBMs. A socket dropped accidentally in a missile silo in Arkansas caused a leak that ultimately led to the explosion of the Titan missile it contained sending the nuclear warhead high into the air before it landed, fortunately unexploded, several hundred yards away. It may seem reassuring that, despite all of the mishaps described in the book, none of the nuclear warheads involved ever detonated as a result of an accident. Seemingly, the "fail safe" mechanisms worked. But, as they say in the world of investing, "Past performance is no guarantee of future results." Disaster was averted but only narrowly in many cases, as Schlosser reports. Methods for making nuclear weapons safer to handle were developed but implementation was successfully opposed for decades by the military, who feared that the safety features would render the weapons less reliable. Most of the action in Command and Control takes place from the 1950's to the early 1980's, presumably because much of the information about current and more recent nuclear weapons' issues is still classified. However, the author does devote a few pages in the epilogue to discussing some changes to the command and control structure that would appear to reduce the risk of accidental detonations or the inadvertent launch of missiles. That is reassuring. Less reassuring, however, is that other nations have joined the nuclear club since the early days, including North Korea, whose unpredictable leader regularly brandishes the threat of nuclear attack against South Korea and/or the West. India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, have fought four wars against one another since 1947 and have a long-standing dispute over the Kashmir region, as well as other grievances. The former Soviet Union seems to maintain fairly tight central control over its nuclear arsenal but even less is known publicly about its command and control system and the nuclear accidents that may have occurred in Russia. Schlosser's book is well researched, informative, and very readable and it is written in a non-technical style for a general audience. It is recommended reading for those who are comfortable thinking about the unthinkable and being reminded that the threat of nuclear annihilation, though diminished since the end of the Cold War, still exists and is likely to remain with us for the foreseeable future.

### ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ Review
*by 新***き on January 13, 2014*

二つの柱で構成されている。まず1980年にアーカンソー州のICBMタイタン発射サイロで猛毒の燃料漏れから始まるパニックが臨場感溢れる描写で追跡される。（ICBMを実際に維持して発射スタンバイをする兵士たちが二十歳前後という若さなのには驚く。）そして時代を辿って水爆搭載爆撃機の事故がいまだに連発していると記録をたどる。いっぽう原爆の開発から広島長崎、つづいてソ連への核攻撃計画を巡るトルーマンとアイゼンハウアー大統領の怖ろしい計画が聴き取り調査と詳しい報告書を発掘して語られる。（西ベルリン封鎖のときは原爆５０発をソ連に打ち込んで地上から抹殺するという軍の計画があり、英仏の反対もあってトルーマン大統領が拒否したという。）本文485ページに対して各パラグラフの記述の裏付け注釈が90ページ、引用文献リストが20ページという筆者の客観視への執念が浮かび上がってくる。かくも核兵器事故が頻発していながらこれまで核爆発しなかった僥倖をどう受け止めたらいいのだろうか。ケネディからジョンソン、レーガン、クリントン大統領たちがそれぞれの補佐役の思想に影響されながら異なる核兵器の考えをとったことが解説されるが、「核兵器の安全メカニズムは肝心な時に爆発を無効にしかねない」という軍の思想もあり、99.99857%安全との報告があるが残りを運任せにしていいわけがない。（2003年の全米空軍ユニット安全審査で半分が不合格だった。）ノンフィクションなので米国に限っているが、読み手からすればこれほど努力しても人為的なミスから核爆発寸前までの恐怖が繰り返されているところをみれば、英仏ロシア中国インドパキスタン北朝鮮の状態はどうか、そして今後怖れているテロリストたちの手に渡ったときの安全は？という疑問が必然的に湧いてくる。まったく凄いノンフィクションだった。

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